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MODES OF PARTICIPATION1 
 
João de Pina-Cabral 
School of Anthropology and Conservation 




We are part of so many things, groups, events, occasions ... you name it.  
Yet, how is one ‘part’ of something? At first, this seems a rather inane 
question; but, if we attend to it a little longer, we soon come to realise that 
the idea of ‘being part’ has far greater philosophical and anthropological 
implications than we might have expected at first; very far from the sort of 
assumed simplicity that is normally attributed to it, this has been a source 
of philosophical debate since the days of Plato.  In turn, anthropologists 
came upon the idea of participation at the end of the nineteenth century, 
and it has challenged them ever since. As this paper highlights, it turns out 
that the way one understands what it means to ‘be part’ can affect one’s 
very central assumptions concerning social life.  
Recently, the notion of ‘participation’ has once again come to the 
forefront of anthropological attention largely due to the role it plays in 
Marshall Sahlins’ attempt to relaunch the study of kinship based on a new 
approach to personhood (2011a, 2011b). Originally brought to 
anthropology by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl at the beginning of the twentieth 
century ([1910] 1951), the concept was enthusiastically adopted by Émile 
 
1 This paper was first debated at the EHESS, Paris, 01/12/2016. I am grateful to Enric Porqueres i Gené 
for that opportunity, as well as to Benoît De L’Estoile for a most productive stay as Invited Professor at 
the Ecole Normale Supérieure at that time. 

































































Durkheim (1915) and Marcel Mauss (e.g. [1926] 1967: 181).  Later on, 
Lévy-Bruhl’s use of it was also an important inspiration to Edmund Husserl 
in his launching of phenomenology (see [1935] 2008).   
Over the years, the complex implications of participation have not 
escaped the attention of a few informed anthropologists.  In his Morgan 
Lectures on magic and religion, Stanley Tambiah revisited them very 
insightfully  (1990: 117–18), and Márcio Goldman (1994) and Frédéric 
Keck (2008) have provided us with studies of Lévy-Bruhl’s thinking where 
the history of the concept of participation is valuably explored. Finally, of 
late, due to the impact of phenomenological insights in the study of 
cognition, philosophers like Evan Thompson (1997), Shaun Gallagher 
(Bower and Gallagher 2013) or De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have been 
using ‘participation’ in ways that turn out to connect directly to 
contemporary anthropological interests (see Pina-Cabral 2017). In this 
paper, I will explore the implications of the concept of participation for 
social scientists (and beyond) by reference to its history, showing that we 
have significant lessons to learn from it.2  
In the sense developed by the authors referred above, participation is 
initially best defined as the ambivalent encounter between the singular and 
the plural in the formation of the person in the world. For example, when 
Husserl wrote to Lévy-Bruhl to thank him for his inspiration, he explained: 
“Saying ‘I’ and ‘we,’ [persons] find themselves as members of families, 
associations, [socialities], as living ‘together,’ exerting an influence on and 
suffering from their world—the world that has sense and reality for them, 
through their intentional life, their experiencing, thinking, [and] valuing.” 
(Husserl 2008 [1935]: 2) During the first year of their lives, in acting and 
being acted upon together in human company, persons become ‘we’ at the 
 
2 The present paper continues the discussion of these themes that I developed in Pina-Cabral 2013 and 
2017.  

































































same time as they become ‘I’, which means that persons will ever be both ‘I’ 
and ‘we’ ambivalently. For so long as anthropology continues to approach 
the ‘we' as if it were a categorical matter—a matter of ‘identity’3—rather 
than as concerning the presence and action of live persons in dynamic 
interaction with the world and each other, participation will continue to be 
a source of theoretical perplexity.   
Husserl again explained that, “at the interactional level, 
intersubjectivity ... implies a kind of perspective-taking that is best 
characterized with metaphors such as ‘trading places’ rather than 
‘achieving understanding’.” (Duranti 2010: 14)  This approach captures 
adequately a trend that has come to the forefront over the past decade not 
only in sociocultural anthropology (e.g. Reyna 2002, Ingold 2010, Duranti 
2010, Desjarlais and Throop 2011, Toren 2012) but also in studies of 
cognition (e.g. Thompson 2007, Gallagher 2009, Hutto and Myin 2013). The 
anthropological (see Toren 1993, 2002), psychological (see Trevarthen 
1980, 1998) and philosophical evidence (see Hutto and Myin 2013, or 
Chemero 2009) that we possess at the moment strongly suggests that 
personhood is better approached not as an automatic (‘natural’) result of 
biological humanity, but as an achievement of each one of us who, during 
our first year of life, become persons by acquiring what the late Peirce 
called ‘symbolic thinking’ (see Short 2007).4  Throughout one’s life, as we 
enter into further participations, this dynamic of self-constitution in the 
world does not stop. 5 Anthropologists, therefore, are called upon to focus 
on personhood not as a given but as a biographical acquisition of each one 
of us. As Sir Raymond Firth put it so long ago in We the Tikopia (as part of 
 
3 That is, not taking into account what Husserlians call “prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience”, 
see Bower and Gallagher 2013, and De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007. 
4 In the wake of Husserl’s phenomenology, philosophers of cognition today are prone to call these modes 
of thinking which characterise adult persons “propositional”, see Hutto 2008 and Hutto and Myin 2013. 
5 See “Steps of Ontogeny of Person and World” in Pina-Cabral 2017: 110-113. 

































































what we might call today his ‘dwelling approach’), the culturally specific 
dynamics involved in personal ontogeny are an essential aspect of 
understanding how personhood differs in different cultures (1936: 120, 
277).  
The principal aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine and analyse 
the notion of ‘being part’ as when it applies to persons in ontogeny. By 
giving up on individuality and taking seriously the lessons on participation 
that the older Lévy-Bruhl left us as heritage (1949), we move to a view of 
personhood that helps us understand better not only the dynamics of 
personhood but also how these affect some of the more enduring problems 
that haunt our world today.6 
 
THE TWO TRADITIONS OF USE OF PARTICIPATION 
On the whole, in the social sciences over the past century, two broad 
traditions of use of the concept of participation can be distinctly identified.  
In this paper, they will be approached both by relation to the history of 
anthropological thinking and to their possible implications in terms of 
anthropological theory.   
The verb ‘to participate’ and the expressions ‘participating’ and 
‘participation’ are defined by most English dictionaries as meaning ‘to 
share in something’, ‘to be involved in something’, ‘to share in the activities 
of a group’.  The Thesaurus gives us a range of associated words, such as 
‘involvement’, ‘engagement’, ‘group action’, ‘commitment’, ‘intervention', 
‘intercession’, ‘to partake’. As a noun, the Latin particeps meant “partaker, 
comrade, fellow soldier”; as an adjective it implied “sharing, partaking”. It is 
said that the verb participare found its origins in the Proto Indo-European 
root *kap, meaning ‘to have’, ‘to grab’, ‘to share’, ‘to take’.  However, as we 
 
6 For an argument of that point by relation to the matter of addiction and the so-called War on Drugs, see 
Hari 2005. 

































































will see, rather than its Latin cousin, it is the Ancient Greek word methexis 
(έθεξις—translated by medieval philosophers as participationem) that lies 
at the root of the contemporary uses of the concept in philosophy.  
In order to ease the exposition, I propose that there are two principal 
families of use relating to the words ‘participate’, ‘participation’, ‘partake’, 
or ‘being part’ (and, by extension, membership7) that have been present in 
the social sciences throughout the twentieth century. I call one of them the 
individual version and the other the dividual version, using the distinction 
that Marilyn Strathern brought to anthropology in her prophetic discussion 
of modes of personhood in Gender of the Gift (1988: 11-14).8 Whilst 
individuality stresses the unitary and bounded nature of entities, 
dividuality affirms the intrinsic plurality of what is identified as single. By 
dividuality, therefore, Strathern meant that, in personhood, plurality is 
anterior to singularity always reimposing itself.  
The primary distinction between the two senses of ‘being part’ is that 
one of them assumes the individuality of the participants and, therefore, 
can only be applied to forms of participation where participants are 
accounted for as separate entities in terms of natural numbers—their 
essences do not merge. This is the sense that Georg Simmel explores in his 
groundbreaking essays (1950 [1908]).  It is the meaning that is normally 
conveyed by the expression ‘being part of’ which relies on a notion of a 
broader entity enclosing a number of smaller entities. In this more 
individualist usage, there is no implication of transcendence or of a 
mystical aspect to the relation between the participants. 
 
7 The French word appartenance, usually translated in English as ‘membership’, plays such an important 
role in Lévy-Bruhl’s personal process of unveiling the meaning of participation (1949 [1938-1939]) that 
it should also be included in this list.  
8 Sahlins adopts it in 2011a and 2011b. The notion emerged in MacKim Marriott’s treatment of Indian 
forms of personhood (1976). 

































































To the contrary, the dividual tradition of use does not assume the 
indivisibility of each participant and rather stresses the modes of 
constitution of participation, focusing on the more transcendent or 
mystical aspects of the relations that participation describes.  It is generally 
conveyed by the expression ‘being part in’ (or ‘participating in’) and it 
relies on a notion of things coming together without clearly determined 
boundaries whilst sharing their essence. In short, dividuality and its related 
concept of partibility involve a questioning of the very processes of 
generation of the entities that enter into a relation.  Therefore, they see the 
person in terms of a dynamic of constant emergence, not as a naturally 
given entity existing once and for all.  
As Strathern argued (1988: 14), persons are dividual to the extent that 
they are fusional but not symmetric; they mobilize anterior alterity, as they 
place the one and the many in dynamic engagement (see also Sahlins 
2011b). In fact, already in his 1935 letter to Lévy-Bruhl, Husserl had made 
it abundantly clear that the anthropologist’s propositions concerning 
participation in ‘primitive thinking’ bore profound implications for the 
development of a phenomenology of personhood which he was engaged in 
at the time (2008).  No wonder, then, that the dividual tradition of use has 
come to be increasingly important in anthropology since the 1980s, as the 
latter opened itself more explicitly to the influence of phenomenology. This 
paper concludes not only that the (more common) ‘individual’ meaning of 
participation has implicit within it a (more complex) ‘dividual’ meaning, 
but also that the implications of this discovery can have a profound impact 
in how we address the world from the angle of the social sciences. 
It seems important to explain from the start that the two modes are 
not placed here as opposites but in a continuum, to the extent that the 
dividual account is both more comprehensive and embraces a more 

































































complex set of phenomena than the individual account. In the social 
sciences, the two traditions of use have interacted from the very beginning, 
often being used indistinguishably. The first work by an anthropologist to 
bring specific theoretical attention to the concept was Lévy-Bruhl’s Les 
fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (first edition 1910) and his 
successive books, where the word ‘participation’ always carries its dividual 
meaning.  As it happens, this was the usage that inspired Durkheim 
towards the end of his life, as the latter explicitly tells us (Durkheim [1912] 
1915: 235 n 733).  As a matter of fact, in his Les formes élémentaires de la 
vie religieuse, Durkheim uses participation in both ways: in the individual 
sense, as when he says that “a certain number of individuals participate in 
the same moral life” (ibid.: 232); and in the dividual sense, as when he 
speaks of ‘mystical participation’ (Lévy-Bruhl’s expression) when 
observing that Aboriginal “men are believed to participate in the nature of 
the animal ...” which is their totem (ibid.: 136). 
According to Ann Rawls, the evolution of Durkheim’s epistemological 
thinking at the time he wrote his last major treatise (he stopped writing 
soon after) was centrally marked by the notion of participation: “Durkheim 
argued that the principles of reason all have their origin in the moral forces 
experienced while participating in certain enacted practices and that 
knowledge derived in this way has only limited validity when applied to the 
natural world.” (1996: 461)  At the turn of the twentieth century, both 
Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim faced the problem of explaining how personal 
sentiments and experiences coexist with collective ideologies and legalised 
moralities.  However, as Frédéric Keck has noted (2008: 150-151), they 
diverged in the way they responded to this central challenge.   
The Durkheimian approach (especially before the change in tone that 
The Elementary Forms represent) tended to be top-down, emphasizing 

































































more the collective representations and the categories that impose 
themselves on the individual, and leaving to second plan the human ethical 
bases of the process of constitution of personhood. For him, the group 
imposes itself forcefully on the individual in terms of its categories 
(Durkheim and Mauss 1963 [1903]). To the contrary, Lévy-Bruhl’s 
approach remains ever attached to the level of the person’s habits, usages, 
and sentiments; being concerned with accounting for the activity of the 
subjects in terms of their feelings and their personal ideas, seeing collective 
coordination as emerging from progressive habituation. This is what Shaun 
Gallagher calls participatory sense-making (2007), that is, “the 
coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby individual 
sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-
making can be generated that are not available to each individual on their 
own.” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007: 497)  
This tendency is further stressed as Lévy-Bruhl’s thought evolves 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Deeply influenced by Maurice Leenhardt’s 
ethnographic work on New Caledonia (e.g. Lévy-Bruhl 1949 [1938-1939]: 
49-ff; Leenhardt 1979 [1947]), the older Lévy-Bruhl is less concerned with 
category formation and classification, since he finds that mythical thinking 
is not centrally moved by contradiction, classification or category 
formation, rather evolving on the bases of the participations of each 
person. Thus, he remains interested in understanding how the person 
confronts the social within themselves, how persons come to be collective.  
Like Durkheim, he sees the collective experience as essentially formative of 
the person, yet he does this not in terms of collective structures imposing 
themselves, but of humans constructing themselves as persons within 
social symbiosis, so to speak.  He calls ‘participation’ to this merging of 
essences that occurs between people in society.   

































































In short, Durkheim favoured an approach that emphasizes the primacy 
of groupness, which he explicitly called ‘sociocentrism’ ([1903] 1963: 51). 
To the contrary, after Durkheim’s death in 1917, Lévy-Bruhl evolved 
progressively towards a more anthropocentric approach, one that focuses 
on the person as the primary instance of human sociality. In this way, 
contrary to standard structural-functionalist understanding, Lévy-Bruhl’s 
latter position9 approaches a phenomenological outlook in that it roots the 
feelings of responsibility of persons in their personal participations, seeing 
them as emerging separately from the formal structures of collective 
morality. In this way, Lévy-Bruhl’s view of the relation between collective 
and individual morality is more akin to the personalism of Arnold Van 
Gennep, who Durkheim so deeply despised. As it happens, this very same 
approach to co-responsibility is what explains the fascination that Husserl, 
and later Emmanuel Lévinas, demonstrated for Lévy-Bruhl’s work (see 
Moran and Steinacher 2008, Husserl 2008 [1935], and Lévinas 1957).   
In fact, part of the reason why the late Lévy-Bruhl was by and large 
ignored during the second half of the twentieth century and why most 
anthropologists have failed to notice how creative and profound was his 
heuristic use of the category of ‘primitive’ is associated to the immense 
force of conviction of the sociocentric consensus that ruled our discipline 
during all of that time (on both sides of the Atlantic).  Curiously, whilst 
Durkheim’s early argument concerning the nature of the categories of the 
understanding remained solidly rooted in a set of primitivist assumptions, 
Lévy-Bruhl’s thinking about participation evolved significantly over time 
and, eventually, towards the end of his life, he freed it completely from the 
primitivist mould (1949 [1938-1939]).   
 
 
9 And that of Evans-Pritchard too, contrary to what is normally assumed (see 1970 [1934]).  See also 
Lévy-Bruhl’s letter to Evans-Pritchard [1934] 1952.  



































































Lévy-Bruhl’s initial observation—emergent from his attentive reading of 
the ethnographic work that was coming out in the decade leading to the 
First World War—was that participation as a principle of ‘primitive 
mentality’ counters the ‘laws of contradiction’ which shore up modern logic 
(1910). From the beginning, he qualified this kind of participation as being 
‘mystical’. But it must be stressed that, for him, the word ‘mystical’ did not 
refer to some sort of spiritual event. Rather, it aimed to describe something 
both he and Mauss repeatedly observed: persons in these ‘primitive’ 
societies were not ‘individual’ in that they participated in other persons 
and in things in ways that conjoin emotion with transcendence. 
Transcendence is used here in a Kantian sense to imply a capacity to move 
beyond physical existence, not in some deist or spiritual sense. As a matter 
of fact, it can be argued that this was also Mauss’ main discovery in his 
essay The Gift, where he observes that a given object takes with it a part of 
the giver with profoundly emotional and transcendental implications 
(2016 [1925]). 
It seems important, therefore, to note that Lévy-Bruhl’s very choice of 
the word ‘participation’ was inspired by an old metaphysical tradition that 
pointed him in this direction.  In Ancient Greek theatre, the concept of 
έθεξις (participation) was originally used to refer to the way in which the 
audience interacted with the actors, thus affecting the development of a 
play. With Plato, however, a tradition was started of attributing an 
ontological meaning to ‘participation’, that is, one that relates it to the 
nature of being. For him, in the famous allegory of the cave, participation 
was the relation between changing things (observable particulars) and the 
changeless forms (the Ideas) that gave them their being: “we generally 
postulate a certain form or character—a single form or character, always—



































































for each plurality of things to which we give the same name.” (Republic X, 
596a) In time, Aristotle criticised this idea, saying that he cannot attribute 
any meaning to the relation that particulars have with forms (“sharing 
means nothing”, he says in Metaphysics VIII, 6).  With him, participation 
gets to be closer in meaning to causality, by reference to the way effects 
‘participate’ in their causes. This is the usage that came to influence St. 
Augustine and subsequent Christian theology. 
More broadly, in etymological terms, “-θεξις bespeaks plurality, 
similarity, relation and asymmetry all at once. ... To speak of metaphysical 
participation is to say that one thing has what it is with and indeed after 
and in pursuit of, another: it has its reality, in other words, by virtue of 
something other than itself.” (Schindler 2005: 1)  Schindler further clarifies 
that “a reference to ‘parts’ is not [an] ingredient in the Greek term as it is in 
the Latin ... We ought not to let this root lead us to envision the 
participatum [the form in which particulars participate] as having discrete 
parts, which is clearly excluded by the metaphysical use of the concept, i.e., 
meaning the sharing in a (metaphysically) simple quality” (ibid.: 1, fn 1). 
I do not presume to revisit here the long and extremely complex 
history of the c0ncept, except to trace the more immediate inspiration for 
the use of the term by Lévy-Bruhl (and subsequently the late Durkheim). 
As he uses it in Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, his first 
book on the topic, Lévy-Bruhl appears to have taken the word from the 
work of Nicolas Malebranche, a late seventeenth century philosopher-
theologian who attempted to merge Neo-Platonist theology (inspired by St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas) with Cartesian rationalism. Lévy-Bruhl 
attributes to Malebranche the expressions ‘participable individuals’ 
([1910] 1951: I/II, 69) and ‘the living are participated by the dead’ ([1910] 
1951: III/IV, 86)—notions that would come to have a long and influential 


































































life in twentieth century anthropology, usually unbeknownst to their users.  
For Malebranche, participation compounded sharing of essence10 with 
causality of being: “God does not derive his being from the creatures; 
rather it is the creatures that are nothing but imperfect participations of 
the divine being.” ([1674-75] 1910: 330, my translation) In this way, and 
following on St. Augustine’s interpretation, to be is a matter of degree, since 
God is taken to be not only the ultimate cause but the highest instance of 
being: “Since God is the highest essence (summa essencia), that is, he is in 
the highest degree and thus is immutably, He has given being to the things 
He has created from nothing, but not Being in the highest degree such as He 
is.”11 
Twentieth century usages of participation in anthropology and 
phenomenology are, therefore, inspired by Aquinas’ latter doctrine of 
participation (as exemplified in his commentary on Boethius’ De 
hebdomadibus, 2001 [1271-2]), where being, living, and understanding 
(esse, vivere et intelligo) are presented as interconnected. Aquinas 
differentiates existence (esse, the act of being) from essence (essencia, the 
truth of a proposition), but in God this difference disappears. We cannot 
know God’s existence directly, he claims, since w  are its effects; “we know 
that God is, because we conceive this proposition in our mind from His 
effects.”12 An effect participates in its cause, not the other way round. In 
Neo-Platonist thought, therefore, by identifying sharing of essence with 
causality of existence, participation acquires a kind of unidirectionality.  
It is this same concept of participation that is going to inspire Lévy-
 
10 The word ‘essence’ (the what-ness or quiddity of a thing) is used here in the sense that Thomas 
Aquinas attributes to it when he says “the essence [essencia] is that which is signified by the definition of 
a thing.” (1997 [1252-53], chap. 2)  
11 From St. Augustin’s De Civitate Dei, 12:2, as translated by Schultz and Synan—in Aquinas 2001: xxi. 
12 As instantiated in the Ontological Proof of God’s existence (see Pina-Cabral 2017: 52-ff)—from 
Quaestio Disputatae De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a.2, ad1: 
 http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/depotentia/Q7#q7a2tit1 


































































Bruhl’s reading of the ethnographic literature available at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Notably exemplified by the Bororos’ claim that they are 
macaws (arara), he observes that a person “frequently experiences 
participations between himself and this or that environing being or object, 
natural or supernatural, with which he is or comes to be in contact, and (...), 
quite as frequently, he imagines similar participations between these 
beings and objects” ([1910] 1951: 77–78).  
This leads him to formulate his famous ‘law of participation’ where the 
Durkheimian notion of ‘collective representation’ plays the role of the Neo-
Platonist God: “all of these [examples] imply a ‘participation’ among beings 
or objects brought together under a collective representation.” (ibid.: 76) 
He identified a similar kind of unidirectionality akin to that of Aquinas’ 
participation in God by His creatures.  Thus, there was a sociocentric 
implication to Lévy-Bruhl’s initial notion of participation in that ‘Society’ 
(placed now in Comtian fashion in the position where God used to be) both 
transmitted essence and produced existence:  “The very existence of social 
groups, in their relations with the existence of the individuals who 
compose them, is most often represented (and felt at the same time as 
represented) as a participation, a communion, or better still as a complex 
of participations and communions.” (ibid.: 93)   
However, over the following three decades, as his thinking 
progressively dissociated itself from the initial Durkheimian influence—
and particularly at the end of his life, inspired by the evidence provided by 
the great ethnographers of the Classical Period (from the late 1920s to the 
early 1950s)—Lévy-Bruhl comes to abandon this directionality of 
participation in favour of a multidirectionality of participation, where 
beings and objects participate in each other in complex webs of mutual 
influence and implication.  The sociocentric notion that ‘society’ 


































































(groupness) is both the cause and the essence of the participation is 
pushed to a second plan in favour of an approach that attributes greater 
centrality to the constitution of the person in time. This is not to say, as 
Sahlins notes, that participation cannot also assume the form of “the 
encompassment of others” in typically hierarchical relations (Sahlins 
2011a: 13).  Indeed, the emergence of the person in early ontogeny is a 
form of encompassment of others, since it occurs in a context of co-
presence where singularity and plurality are jointly operative (see 
Hattiangadi 2005).  
In the course of the 1930s, as his thought evolves and as he collects 
further ethnographic examples, Lévy-Bruhl drops the central notions that 
had initially launched his project: both that of ‘primitive’ and that of 
‘prelogical’.13 He never abandons the preoccupation with describing how 
humans have different outlooks on reality and that these must be studied 
as different—the founding call of all anthropology, one might say.  But he 
comes to understand that all forms of human thinking are foundationally 
related among them by some basic disposition of humans to make sense of 
the world in participation with each other. The concept of participation, 
thus, comes to assume a central importance in describing how this basic 
disposition operates, and it comes to play for him a foundational role. 
He explicitly lets us know that one of the important turning points in 
his thinking was an essay on “Physics and Reality” that Albert Einstein 
wrote in 1936, when he was an exile in Paris.  There, the physicist argues: 
One may say ‘the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility’. ... In 
speaking here of ‘comprehensibility’, the expression is used in its most modest 
sense. It implies: the production of some sort of order among sense impressions, 
 
13 “Today—and this is surely a progress—I no longer search for a difference between primitive mentality 
and ours from a logical point of view.” (Lévy-Bruhl, 1949: 71, my translation) Why authors like Ann 
Rawls fail to register this evolution, preferring to ignore Lévy-Bruhl’s crowning achievements as 
inscribed in his posthumously published Notebooks, is puzzling to me (Rawls 1996: 462).  As it happens, 
this is just the contrary of what she does for Durkheim, whose evolution is her central theme.  


































































this order being produced by the creation of general concepts, and by definite 
relations of some kind between the concepts and sense experience. It is in this 
sense that the world of our sense experiences is comprehensible. The fact that it is 
comprehensible is a miracle. ([1936] 1954: 292)  
 
Lévy-Bruhl is struck by Einstein’s argument that this “intelligibility14 
of the world of the senses that science orders and sets to rules is in itself 
ultimately unintelligible.” (1949: 49)  Thus, he is led to contemplate that 
the difference between ‘primitive’ thought and ‘our’ thought would be 
“simply one of degree” (ibid.). By conjoining Einstein’s observation with 
Leenhardt’s ethnographic evidence concerning the person in New 
Caledonia (in the reading of which he was deeply immersed at the time), he 
abandons his original preoccupation with ‘logical meaning’. He now sees 
that conceptual (propositional) thinking—as in scientific explanation—sits 
on top of a more basic form of construction of meaning, one that depends 
centrally on the person’s engagement with the world and others in the 
course of personal ontogeny and that, consequently depends on what he 
calls sentiments (Fr. feelings/affects). In order to describe this 
participatory sense-making, Lévy-Bruhl takes recourse to the Kantian 
notion of ‘orientation’, that is, “the logic of affect [which] corresponds to an 
action of the body towards things and not an abstract reasoning.” (Keck 
2008: 139) 
In this way, Lévy-Bruhl moves beyond the polarisation of ‘primitives’ 
and ‘us’. His answer is that ‘participation’ (and its corresponding 
‘orientations’) is at the root of all thinking. Persons are surrounded by 
appartenances, that is, things and persons in which they participate and 
which give sense to their world. He tells us that he can best qualify 
 
14 Einstein’s original word was Begreiflichkeit, for which the translator uses the word ‘comprehensibility’ 
when Lévi-Bruhl’s ‘intelligibility’ would seem to do just as well. 


































































‘participation’ by the etymological meaning of sympathy, a ‘feeling with’ 
(1949: 59). We will have to wait for yet another half century before people 
like Varela (cf. Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991) and Damásio (1999) 
come to argue that emotion cannot be separated from cognition, thus 
corroborating Lévy-Bruhl’s profound insight. 
Lévy-Bruhl goes on to differentiate between conceptual thinking 
(what philosophers of cognition now call ‘propositional thinking’, see Hutto 
2008) and participation: “Participation has no reality other than in being 
felt by an individual ... It is therefore an event ... localised in space and time 
or, better said, has its own space and its own time. This means that ... there 
are no contradictions but only contrasts; events are composed one with the 
other, or oppose each other more or less strongly; as they are felt in their 
own space and time, they cannot exclude each other.” (1949: 51, my 
translation)  In this way, he moves to abandon his original conception that 
there would be a “law of participation” that would be the foundation of 
primitive thinking as the Aristotelian “laws of contradiction” are the 
foundation of modern logic. Rather, participation becomes for him a 
general fact of human experience: “What remains is the fact (not law) that 
the ‘primitive’ often experiences participations between himself and this or 
that surrounding being or object, of a natural or supernatural kind, with 
which he is or enters into contact, and that, just as frequently, he imagines 
such participations between beings and objects ... ” (ibid.: 52). The feeling 
of participation has a “fundamental character” (ibid.: 69). The 
participations people experience, therefore, are not experienced as part of 
rational deliberation but as facts of experience that ground conceptual 
elaboration, they are more akin to perception than to thought. 
As he himself abandoned the sense of metaphysical unidirectionality 
of participation that he had inherited from Malebranche and the Comtian 


































































tradition, so did most anthropologists that came to use the notion of 
participation in the second half of the twentieth century. Stanley Tambiah, 
for example, makes a singularly valuable contribution to this discussion, 
which is informed already by the reading of Donald Davidson and other 
philosophers of the period (1990: 117–18). While—much like Sahlins 
(2011a, 2011b)—he stresses that participation is at the root of kinship, 
Tambiah shows how it “emphasizes sensory and affective communication 
and the language of the emotions” (1990: 108). Thus, he claims, it is the 
basis of religious or magical phenomena. This is how Tambiah redefines 
Lévy-Bruhl’s concept: “Participation can be represented as occurring when 
persons, groups, animals, places, and natural phenomena are in a relation 
of contiguity, and translate that relation into one of existential immediacy 
and contact and shared affinities” (ibid.: 107). By taking recourse to the 
word “existential”—which was by then a recognisable concept in general 
social scientific jargon—Tambiah is attempting to bypass the 
phenomenological complexity of what he is actually conveying. 
Unfortunately, once again, as in the case of Lévy-Bruhl’s editor Bruno 
Karsenti (1998), Tambiah adopts the characteristic midcentury 
representationist and sociocentric approach, where both groups and 
persons are held to hold ‘representations’ and these are considered to be 
phenomena of the same nature. In light of the critique of this model of mind 
that the theories of embodied cognition represent (e.g. Chemero 2009), we 
are faced today with the challenge of matching Lévy-Bruhl’s profound 
insights concerning participatory sense-making with contemporary 
approaches to cognition.  
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Before moving on, however, it seems important to consider the alternative 
tradition of use of the concept of participation. I trace the principal input 
towards an individual use to the deep influence of the German sociological 
school in the English-speaking world at mid-century. For example, if we 
run through the English translation of Max Weber’s Economy and Society, 
we will not find a single instance in which the word ‘participation’ is used 
in its dividual sense.15 His holding on to a consistently individualist 
understanding of what it is to be human is similarly reproduced in Georg 
Simmel’s highly influential works, where personal interaction is 
understood as a form of coordination among individuals. 
The primary instance must surely be Simmel’s seminal essay 
“Quantitative Aspects of the Group” ([1908] 1950: 87-180). From its 
original translation into English in Chicago in 1950, this essay became a 
central reference for sociological thinking (and we cannot discount the 
decisive impact that this ontological background had in American cultural 
anthropology in the second half of the twentieth century through Talcott 
Parsons’ formative influence on Clifford Geertz and David Schneider16).  
The essay’s starting premise is the unquestioned unicity of the individual. 
Whilst Simmel perceives clearly that ‘group form’ can only be achieved 
when there are more than three persons involved, this insight is not 
accompanied by a questioning of the nature of the relation between the 
singular and the plural.  The naturalization of the person as individual 
prevents him from granting anteriority to alterity and means that he 
founds his sociology on a form of theoretical individualism.  The theme of 
intersubjectivity does not play a role in his analysis and the properties that 
intersubjective relations are normally held to possess are treated by him as 
 
15 Although there is a curiously undeveloped reference to ‘sympathetic participation’ (1978: I, 5). 
16  See Sahlins: “Schneider was trained in an era of social science hubris that from its centre in the lesser 
Cambridge spread its Parsonian doctrine that any differences that could be ‘usefully’ discerned in the 
object of anthropological study were legitimate analytic distinctions.” (2011: 6) 


































































features of ‘small groups’—ones, dyads, and triads—by opposition to larger 
groups.   
As it happens, however, we find in Simmel’s essay the marks of a 
struggle with the uncomfortable possibility of personhood being a complex, 
constructed process—not being, in fact, fundamentally individual. For 
example, he meets with the problem when attempting to resolve the matter 
of personal reflexivity (that is, a person’s knowledge of him or herself as 
person): “Morality”, he argues, “develops in the individual through a 
second subject that confronts him in himself. By means of the same split 
through which the ego says to itself ‘I am’—confronting itself, as a knowing 
subject, with itself as a known subject—it also says to itself ‘I ought to’.  The 
relation of two subjects that appears as an imperative is repeated within 
the individual himself by virtue of the fundamental capacity of our mind to 
place itself in contrast to itself, and to view and treat itself as if it were 
somebody else.” (ibid.: 99) The feat of reflexivity is portrayed here as a 
‘capacity of the mind’ that allows for the constitution of the person, not as a 
feature of the whole person in ontogeny. Yet, whilst personhood implies 
reflexivity, it is not preceded by it. 
Therefore, after this passage, Simmel feels h  needs to make a caveat: 
“I do not here answer the question whether this phenomenon represents a 
transference of the empirically prior interindividual relation to the 
elements within the individual, or whether it is a purely spontaneous 
process originating in these elements.” ([1908] 1950: 99) Much as he might 
want to avoid it, the matter of what kind of ‘elements’ we are dealing with, 
cannot be avoided. If, indeed, either ‘interindividuality’ is anterior to 
individuality or personhood is composed of elements, then the question is 
what are these parts and how do they come to form an ‘individual’ entity. In 
short, what this discussion clarifies is that the questions posed by dividual 

































































participation lay dormant within the sense of individual participation that 
modernist sociology favoured. There is, one is tempted to say, a 
metaphysical act of faith at the root of Simmel’s sociology. 
Here, we are not very far from the well-known and much debated 
metaphysical problems that the ‘origin of social facts’ posed to persons 
such as Comte, Durkheim, or Lévi-Strauss (e.g. Badcock 1975: 33). The 
recourse to the notion of gestalt in explaining the individuality of both 
persons and groups is, after all, a version of the same problem.17 That is, 
one would want individuals to form what G.E. Moore called ‘external 
relations’, that is, a situation where the entities are not constituted by the 
relations (1919).  But social life provides us constantly with examples of 
the contrary and, thus, in order to explain the dividuality of the supposedly 
individual entities, Comte, Simmel or Durhkeim were faced to undertake 
this metaphysical leap.   
For example, when considering the commonly encountered example of 
institutions (such as committees or administrative bodies) being named by 
the number of their constituent parts, Simmel remarks that “the idea 
expressed by this sum is the functional interactive togetherness of the 
group” (1950: 107). Thus, when the institution is known by a name 
referring to a number, such as ‘Six’ for a committee composed of six 
members, this “does not refer to six individual and isolated elements but to 
their synthesis. ‘Six’ is not ‘1 plus 1 plus 1,’ etc., but a new concept emerging 
from the synthesis of these elements: it is not, so to speak, proportionally 
present in each of them.” (ibid., my emphasis)  Note how he pushes the 
problem aside by talking of a concept; yet, the matter was not how an 
observer thinks of an institution, but how the institution actually acts as an 
institution; its features qua institution. 
 
17 I suppose that Rawls would call this the relation between Durkheim’s epistemology and his sociology of 
knowledge (1996). 


































































Erving Goffman is probably, among all sociologists, the author who 
prolonged more creatively this line of reasoning. As in Simmel’s, in his 
work, participation assumes implicitly both the pre-existence of the group 
to the interaction, and the pre-existence of the person (the individual) to 
the interaction—none of which is the case with Lévy-Bruhl’s approach. In 
Goffman’s analyses, the self sits like a dress or a mask upon the person 
who, conceived as individual, is presented as ultimately natural. 
Participation is the occurrence of a joint effort on the part of individuals 
who find themselves involved in social activities that are given to them 
largely as an option. So Goffman accepts that the ‘selves’ actually are 
constituted in the moment, but he does not see them as the essence of what 
is at stake. The essence lies in the individual who is always taken to be 
previously existent. For Goffman, individuals do not participate as total 
persons; selves sit on top of individuals like they were dresses or skins 
guiding their participation: “during face-to-face encounters individuals may 
participate officially in more than one capacity”([1967] 2005: 52).  
Goffman’s more elaborate treatment of the issue of participation can 
be found in his long essay “Footing” ([1967] 2005). Here, participation is 
initially used in its individual sense.  However, as is so often the case with 
Goffman, as his arguments evolve concerning how humans interact 
linguistically, the dividual meaning starts to emerge. Towards the end of 
the paper, it becomes obvious that the two meanings of ‘being part’ are 
essentially interdependent.18   
The subject of the paper is how humans talk. Goffman starts from the 
assumption that the units of ‘talk’ are individuals—they are natural and 
pre-existent. In fact, when he speaks of ‘official participants’, ‘ratified 
participants’, or ‘adventitious participants’, he is assuming that these are 
 
18 For a similar condition, see Goodwin and Goodwin 2004. 

































































individual—that is, fully self-defined, clearly identifiable, and neatly 
bounded units of social interaction whose bodily boundaries constitute 
their essential determination. However, soon enough, he realizes that his 
default approach to human communication—which assumes that the 
participants in ‘talk’ are clearly determined individual units—misinterprets 
seriously what actually is going on when humans talk: “the common dyadic 
model of speaker-hearer specifies sometimes too many, sometimes too few, 
sometimes the wrong participants.” ([1967] 2005: 145)  He shows that, as 
speakers, “it is not true to say that we always speak our own words and 
ourself take the position to which these words attest” (ibid.: 146); and, as 
hearers, we conceal “a complex differentiation of participation statuses” 
(ibid.). As he puts it, “if language is to be traced back to some primal scene, 
better it is traced back to the occasional need of a grunted signal to help 
coordinate action in what is already the shared world of a joint task than to 
a conversation in and through which a common subjective universe is 
generated.” ([1967] 2005: 141) In short, when we are dealing with 
interactions among persons in ontogeny, to be ‘one of many’ and to ‘merge 
with others’ are activities that seldom can be clearly distinguished, because 
the nature of the subject is dependent on the interaction and cannot be 
considered a pre-given. 
In human talk, singularity and plurality (the ‘I/me’ and the ‘we’) are 
constantly shifting and dyadic confrontation always remains unstable (see 
Strathern 1988:11-14).  In sum, Goffman remains bound by an individualist 
view of personhood, where an individual sense is the default assumption, 
but he opens up a window towards a more dividual sense of participation, 
corresponding to a fusional process of sharing of essences. The individual 
mode of approaching participation turns out to be a subcategory of the 
dividual (phenomenological) meaning of the expression. The presence of a 

































































more dividual understanding of what it means to participate ultimately 
imposes itself.   
In this way, we make way for something that Goffman, quite as much 
as Lévy-Bruhl, had identified but struggled to formulate: the possibility of a 
person being itself and another.  This, in fact, corresponds to one of more 
profound insights of the late Lévy-Bruhl: 
What turns participation into something that appears to be irreconcilable with the 
habitual norms of the intellect, is that, without realizing it, we assume that, in 
primitive mentalité, beings are first given and then participate of this or that other 
person, of this or that supernatural force, etc.—without our being able to 
understand how this participation can be established, how a being can be at the 
same time itself and another … (1949:250). 
 
Thus, he inverts the traditional individualist perspective on personal 
constitution. Persons are no longer seen as “beings [that] are given 
beforehand and then enter into their participations” (1949: 250). Rather,  
Participation is not simply a mysterious and inexplicable fusion between beings 
who lose and keep at the same time their id ntity. It enters into the constitution of 
these same beings. Without participation they would not have been a given of 
their own experience: they would not have existed. ... Participation, therefore, is 
immanent to the individual as he owes what he is to it. (1949:250, my emphasis) 
 
  Thus, he concludes, “it is impossible for the individual to separate in 
himself what is properly his and that with which he participates in order to 
exist” (1949: 251).  Dividual participation, therefore, is the groundwork 
upon which everyday social interaction is constituted. All individualist uses 
of participation—much as they might appear to simplify matters—
ultimately meet up with the problem of explaining how the participants are 
constituted as participants. This is the challenge that both Lévy-Bruhl and 
Sahlins were led to face. 



































































The notion that sociality is a cover (a role, a mask, a veil) that we place over 
our essential natural individuality is a deeply engrained background 
assumption of the social sciences. We are unwitting heirs to a centuries’ old 
heritage that sees human thinking as the operation of the ‘soul/spirit’ 
(Givens 2009)—that is, mind is something that occurs inside each one of us 
in separation from our body (albeit related to it in some usually 
unfathomable way via the emotions).  Although most anthropologists have 
been for many decades conscious of the need to dispense with categories 
such as spirit or soul, they have been insufficiently watchful of the fact that 
their representationist background assumptions depend on such categories 
(see Spackman and Yanchar 2015, Pina-Cabral 2017).  
From the days of Tylor, anthropologists have believed that ‘others’ are 
animists, not ‘us’; a discussion that has lately been relaunched in 
interesting new terms (see Descola 2013). Nevertheless, the assumption 
that ‘they’ (those whom our predecessors called 'primitives') are animists 
whilst ‘we’ are materialists needs to be fundamentally questioned. As it 
happens, ‘we’ are the main culprits of animism in that we are the ones that 
assume that our bodies are inhabited by (conscious, reasonable, ethical) 
spirits. As I have extensively argued elsewhere (see Pina-Cabral 2017), 
anthropologists have continued to work unwittingly with notions of 
thought as representation that have prevent them from exploring as 
profoundly as is needed the full implications of embodiment. Lévy-Bruhl’s 
notion of participation, in that it connects dynamically personhood with 
sociality, is a door that allows us to explore creatively new fields of 
anthropological analysis. 
As persons, we are always almost-one (partible) and slightly more 

































































than one (dividual). The anthropological, psychological (see Trevarthen 
1980, 1998) and philosophical evidence (see Hutto and Myin 2013, or 
Chemero 2009) that persons are both partible and dividual and that 
personhood is not an automatic (natural) result of biological humanity is 
overwhelming since before the days of Lévy-Bruhl (see, for example, Firth’s 
debate on personal ontogeny in his Tikopia ethnography, 1936). The 
problem, then, is that too many anthropologists have been unwilling to 
contemplate that the world really does not turn out to be the way our 
ancestors had conceived it. Anthropologists are loath to admit that there is 
no essentiality to personhood—individuality remains the default mode. 
They lack the courage of Lévy-Bruhl and, in fact, they prefer to deride him 
as somehow ‘ethically’ culpable!  
Yet it turns out that the notion of individuality is as wrong when 
applied to persons as when it is applied to rats or amoebas (see Lévi-
Strauss 2000, Pina-Cabral 2017: 138-142). Live beings are not monads; 
they are not little pellets of meaning that some demiurge produces out of 
some ethereal machine. Live beings are emergent properties in the process 
of life; they are processually constituted and cannot ever be dissociated 
from life’s dynamism, their mind is a function of their embodiment (see 
Thompson 1997). Sociality, therefore, is not a force that is superimposed 
on life, as Durkheim depicted it. Rather, sociality—the capacity to address 
the world with a purpose in order to survive as a species—is the basic 
condition of life (as Bateson defended a long time ago, 1972). The complex 
sociality of dolphins and primates is an emergent property within sociality 
more generally (see Hattiangadi 2005), and so is personhood, a condition 
that only embodied humans who actively participate in the world with 
other humans can fulfill.   
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